Security

Version 1.1 · 2026-11-17

How Attify protects the data it reads, what it keeps, for how long, and who can see it. Each statement describes what the service does today. The Privacy Policy and the Data Processing Agreement are the commitments; this page explains the mechanics behind them.

Encryption

  • In transit. The site and the API are served over HTTPS (TLS). The web app tells browsers to use HTTPS only (HSTS). Alert webhooks are sent to https addresses only.
  • Credentials at rest. Everything that grants access to a customer's systems is sealed with envelope encryption before it is stored: connector credentials (OAuth tokens and API keys for help desks, CRMs, calendars, booking tools, agent platforms and observability tools), Ingest API deployment keys, and alert webhook addresses with their signing secrets. Each secret gets its own random data key and is encrypted with AES-256-GCM; the data key is wrapped by a key-encryption key that lives in the host's environment and never in the database. The row's own id is bound to the ciphertext, so a sealed value copied into another row does not open. The key can be rotated: values sealed under an earlier key keep opening until they are resealed under the new one.
  • Links. Check links, sign-in links, invitations, share links and investor request links are random tokens, and only their SHA-256 hash is stored.
  • Signatures. Attestations (a published score and a program's status, and a traction report) are signed with Ed25519, and so is the receipt Attify returns for every batch of witnessed data (what arrived and when). The public keys are published at /.well-known/proven-keys.json. After a key rotation the earlier public keys stay published, so everything they signed still verifies.
  • Witnessed data. A deployment's events are accepted only with a key Attify issued for that deployment: shown once, stored sealed, revocable. Each request is signed with it (HMAC-SHA256), and a signature more than 300 seconds from Attify's clock is refused. OpenTelemetry exporters, which cannot sign, send the key as a bearer token over TLS.
  • Keys in production. The deployed API refuses to start without its encryption, signing and evidence keys and its API key.

Retention and purge

  • Message text from a connected source is kept for TEXT_RETENTION_DAYS (30 days by default) after the conversation's last update, then deleted. The setting cannot be shorter than the scoring period, so the judge always reads the whole period. The judge's cached answers for that connection are deleted with the text, and any redacted excerpt a score quoted from it is removed from the score.
  • Witnessed text is redacted when it arrives, before it is stored, and deleted at most TEXT_RETENTION_DAYS after it arrives, whether or not the customer consented. The text of system and tool messages is not kept, and events hold no text at all.
  • What stays after the purge: the records without their text (times, ids, who wrote each message), which serve as contacts for the repeat-contact check, and the scores. A stored outcome holds whether a record was eligible, claimed and audited, when it started and under which standard version: no text and no customer id.
  • Uploads. An uploaded file is deleted within 30 minutes of upload, or when the full audit finishes. A check's results and PDFs are deleted after 30 days.
  • Disconnect. Disconnecting deletes the connection and everything read from it: records, scores, stored outcomes, queued jobs, the sealed credentials and the judge cache. Attify also withdraws its access at the platform where the platform's API allows it, and otherwise shows where to revoke it. Deleting a deployment deletes everything it sent.
  • Your organization. An owner can export the organization's data as JSON (never message text or secrets) and delete the organization. Consent records and audit-log entries stay, as the record of what was agreed and done; they hold no message text.

Access controls

  • The API key. Every call to the API needs its key, except the health check and the Ingest API, which takes deployment keys instead. Browsers never see the key: the web app's server adds it, and the build fails if the key reaches any file a browser downloads.
  • Sign-in. People sign in through Clerk. The API verifies every session token through the provider's published keys: signature, issuer, expiry and the site it was issued for.
  • Roles. In every organization, people are owners or members; exports, deletion, alerts and other owner actions are refused to members. A connection is visible only to its token holder or the members of the organization that connected it.
  • Every route is tested. Each API route is classified by who may call it: anyone with the API key, a token holder, a signed request, a signed-in person, an owner, Attify's staff, or Attify's admins. Tests call every route as each kind of caller and expect a refusal where that caller has no right. A new route fails the tests until it is classified. A deployed API answers nothing without its key and serves no development routes.
  • Staff access. The reviewer and admin roles count only in Attify's own organization, so no customer can grant itself staff access. Reviewers label a redacted sample of conversations in the human audit, blind to the judge's labels.

Sub-processors

Attify uses these sub-processors, each for its own purpose (DPA, Annex III has what each receives and where):

Sub-processorPurpose
AnthropicThe LLM judge: sampled, redacted conversation text
RenderAPI hosting (EU, Frankfurt)
SupabaseThe Postgres database (EU, Frankfurt)
VercelWeb app hosting
ClerkSign-in and organizations
PolarPayments, as merchant of record
ResendTransactional email
SentryError monitoring, only when enabled
PostHogPage analytics, cookieless, only when enabled
ImprovMXForwarding mail sent to Attify's addresses

The help desks, CRMs, calendars, booking tools, agent platforms and observability tools a customer connects are the customer's own providers. Attify reads from them with the customer's authorization, read-only.

When a customer agrees to a vendor's verification program, Attify records who agreed, when, the exact words of the scope shown, and the standard and rules versions. Consent, publication, revocation, sharing, billing and plan changes, alerts, exports, deletions, deployment keys and a vendor's attestations are written to an append-only audit log: the database itself refuses to change or delete an entry, and entries outlive the organization they belong to. Owners read their organization's entries in Settings. The audit log never holds message text, tokens or secrets.

Logging

  • Every request is logged once, by its route template, never by its raw path, because share, invitation and check tokens sit in paths. Logs never carry message text.
  • Errors are reported to Sentry only when it is configured; otherwise nothing leaves the server. A report carries the error's type and where in the code it happened: no message, no variables, no request body, no user.
  • Tests check that message text never reaches the logs, and that no table holds a conversation's words after the purge.

Reporting a security issue

Write to security@attify.app. Please include what you found and how to reproduce it, and give us a chance to fix it before you share it.